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A POST SR 08-8 WORLD
Today, compliance is on the minds of just about every congress person,
regulator, lawyer, and financial service professional. Although not every
financial corporation can follow in the footsteps of JPMorgan and hire
3,000 employees and spend $1.5 billion to overhaul its compliance
function, the entire financial sector is retooling compliance programs to
meet the evolving demands of a variety of federal, state, and even
international regulators.1
INTRODUCTION
After one of the worst financial crises since the Great Depression,
compliance has become one of the most sought after areas on Wall Street.2
Demand for compliance expertise has started to increase rapidly, as
organizations have had to strengthen and build more effective compliance
programs.3 Given the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley,4 Dodd-Frank,5 and
the continued regulatory pressure on the markets and banking institutions,
companies will need to ensure adherence with the relevant rules and
regulations in order to grow, merge, and prosper.6
Compliance has been in the spotlight during various scandals that have
affected large banking organizations. In September 2013, JPMorgan
disclosed it was hiring an additional 2,000 compliance officers to work on
various compliance issues regarding the “London Whale” trading scandal.7
1. Victoria Rivkin, After the Fall: The Rising Need for Compliance Lawyers in a Post-
Financial Crisis World, 18 BROOK. L. SCH. LAWNOTES, Fall 2013, at 20, 21 (2013).
2. Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, Wall Street’s Hot Hire: Anti-Money Laundering




4. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-2047, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
6. Nick Allard, Why Compliance Experts Are the New Key to Mega-Deals, YAHOO! FINANCE
(July 15, 2013, 3:19 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/why-compliance-experts-
key-mega-deals-191921713.html.
7. Lauren Tala LaCapra & David Henry, JPMorgan to Spend $4 Billion on Compliance and
Risk Controls, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2013, 10:09 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/us-usa-jpmorgan-risk-idUSBRE98C00720130913. The
London Whale scandal occurred during April and May 2012, in which JPMorgan’s Chief
Investment Office booked outsized transactions involving credit default swaps that culminated in
a large trading loss that led to a number of investigations to examine the firm’s risk management
system and internal controls.
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During the same time period, HSBC also hired 3,000 compliance officers to
bring its total compliance workforce to over 5,000 employees.8
There have been a multitude of challenges imposed on banking
organizations since 2008. Some of these challenges have come in the form
of new regulations, standards, and guidelines that need to be interpreted and
monitored requiring firms to increase their compliance presence.9
Furthermore, the task of compliance has become more complex for
financial institutions that have a global presence and therefore implicates a
plethora of conflicting local laws, supervisory authorities, and cultural
differences.10
As the compliance function gains popularity with its rising importance
in banking organizations, it is vital for leaders in the organization to fully
understand the best way to position respective compliance departments to
ensure they are effective and robust. Compliance is a relatively new
industry11 that has seen huge growth in the past few years after the financial
crisis.12 Unfortunately, there is no “one-size fits all” approach13 that can be
taken for compliance programs given that each organization must look to its
overall risk profile to determine the approach that will best fit its needs. In
order to create an effective and robust compliance program, leaders in the
organization need to be aware of best practices and regulatory guidance to
ensure that compliance risk is adequately mitigated. Part I of this Note will
explore the history and background of compliance functions within large
banking organizations, primarily focusing on the regulatory guidance that
has been provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve as to
how an independent compliance function should operate within large
banking organizations. Part II provides an analysis of how the current
incentive-based compensation arrangement for compliance staff and the
reporting line structure for compliance departments may be construed as an
inherent contradiction against the regulatory guidance provided for how an
independent compliance department should function. Part III suggests
alternative options to today’s current compensation setup and reporting line
structure, taking into consideration the guidance promulgated by the
Federal Reserve, along with practical concerns that exist within large
banking organizations.
8. HSBC to Bring in 3,000 Compliance Staff, HR GRAPEVINE (Sept. 25, 2013),
http://www.hrgrapevine.com/markets/hr/article/2013-09-25-hsbc-to-bring-in-3-000-compliance-
staff.
9. McKinsey & Co., Compliance and Control 2.0: Unlocking Potential Through Compliance
and Quality-Control Activities, MCKINSEYWORKING PAPERS ON RISK, June 2012, at 1.
10. Id.
11. Emmanuel Olaoye, After SAC, Corporate Monitor Says What Makes Effective Compliance
Programs, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2013), http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/interview-after-
sac-corporate-monitor-says-what-makes-effective-compliance-programs/.
12. Viswanatha & Wolf, supra note 2.
13. Olaoye, supra note 11.
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It is important to emphasize that this Note focuses on compliance
functions within traditional banking organizations as opposed to
compliance functions within the investment advisory or broker-dealer space
of financial services firms. Compliance operates in different spheres
utilizing the same fundamental skill set and focus on controls within both
spaces; however, the varying set of rules and regulations that investment
advisory and broker-dealer firms face call for a different setup and
operation of the overall compliance landscape.14 Banks are regulated under
the authority of various banking regulators, primarily the Federal Reserve,
along with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation,15 while securities regulators primarily
include the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.16
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF COMPLIANCE
A. DEVELOPMENT OFCOMPLIANCEWITHIN LARGE BANKING
ORGANIZATIONS
Compliance programs exist today as departments or units within
banking organizations and have a wide range of roles and responsibilities,
including monitoring trading activity, preventing conflicts of interest, and
providing surveillance to prevent money laundering, among many other
roles that ensure adherence with applicable laws, rules, and regulations.17
Compliance officers work to identify risks and develop targeted trainings
and policies, along with tailored monitoring programs to address potential
risks and deter misconduct.18 There are a variety of departments within the
bank that compliance officers interact with on a day-to-day basis, including
the business areas, legal department, internal audit department, and the
14. See James A. Fanto, Advising Compliance in Financial Firms: A New Mission for the
Legal Academy, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2013) (exploring the increasing
importance of compliance within the legal academy, with a focus on compliance in the broker-
dealer context). See also Barbara Black, Punishing Bad Brokers: Self-Regulation and FINRA
Sanctions, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 23 (2013) (discussing the regulatory landscape
within the broker-dealer space).
15. Stephen D. Simpson, The Banking System: Commercial Banking—How Banks Are
Regulated, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/banking-system/banking-
system6.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). The Federal Reserve mainly regulates state-chartered
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve system, the OCC regulates national and federal
savings bank associations, and the FDIC insures state-chartered banks that are not members of the
Federal Reserve system.
16. Other US Regulators: Regulatory Agencies, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/other-
us-regulators (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
17. Compliance Department, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/compliancedepartment.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
18. Olaoye, supra note 11.
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other risk management departments.19 While many compliance officers
have a legal background to assist in interpreting and applying the rules and
regulations, others lacking the legal background have the depth of
experience from working in the business area.20
Some firms have opted to place compliance within the overall risk
management umbrella.21 Risk Management (Risk) generally involves
identifying, analyzing, and accepting or mitigating uncertainty of the
overall market such that the business is aware of certain risk thresholds.22
Traditional enterprise risk management has its foundations in capital
management for credit, market, interest rate, and operational risk.23
Compliance’s responsibilities are also distinct from the traditional risk
management areas.24 Because compliance departments are relatively new
and have a constantly evolving set of responsibilities, some firms have,
sometimes for lack of a better placement, inserted compliance within the
overall enterprise-risk management umbrella even though it may not be the
most appropriate place for the compliance function to sit in.25 Therefore, the
reporting structure and overall hierarchy where compliance may be found
within the organization is not consistent across companies because there is
often a lack of clarity as to who in the organization is responsible for
compliance.26 It is useful then to look to the history of compliance to
determine the best approach for creating an effective compliance program.
There is no one point in time that can serve as the genesis for
compliance departments within organizations; rather, we can look to
various antecedents that prompted organizations to develop and invest in
compliance.27 Some trace the history of compliance back to the turn of the
twentieth century when public safety agencies began to emerge spurred on
by novels such as The Jungle,28 which generated an increased friction and
distrust between private businesses and customers.29 As compliance may
have had its roots formed earlier in the century, modern-day compliance
organization began in 1977 with the requirements of the Foreign Corrupt
19. What Does a Compliance Officer Do?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.org/what-does-a-
compliance-officer-do.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
20. Id.
21. Paul L. Lee, Compliance: A New Paradigm, 121 BANKING L.J. 867, 873 (2004).
22. Risk Management, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/riskmanagement.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
23. Lee, supra note 21, at 872.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. McKinsey & Co., supra note 9, at 3.
27. JEFFREY M. KAPLAN, SEMI-TOUGH: A SHORT HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS
PROGRAM LAW 1, 1–9 (2012).
28. The Jungle is a novel by muckraker Upton Sinclair, written in 1906, to expose horrid
working conditions. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
29. John MacKessy, Knowledge of Good and Evil: A Brief History of Compliance, FIN.
PROF’LS’ POST (May 26, 2010), http://post.nyssa.org/nyssa-news/2010/05/a-brief-history-of-
compliance.html.
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Practices Act (FCPA).30 The FCPA was signed into law after an
investigation by the SEC uncovered significant bribery activity within
United States companies.31 As a result, the FCPA ensured that many
companies developed their own internal resources to “actively monitor”
business activities to maintain compliance with the applicable rules and
regulations.32
The most important development for compliance was the advent of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO) in 1991 by the
United States Sentencing Commission.33 The FSGO was groundbreaking—
it provided the first significant incentive for organizations to create a formal
compliance program.34 The FSGO was geared to encourage deterrence and
to ensure that companies would proactively take steps to prevent and detect
violations.35 Under the FSGO, organizations were provided with a sentence
downgrade for a violation if they could demonstrate the existence of an
“effective compliance program.”36 This led to the burgeoning of the
compliance industry, as organizations developed entire departments to
focus on compliance in hopes of qualifying for the sentence downgrade if
the corporation were subject to an investigation and found in violation.37
Courts began to note the powerful effect of the FSGO within
organizations. In 1996, the Court of Chancery of Delaware decided In re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, and noted the FSGO
offered “powerful incentives for corporations today to have in place
compliance programs to detect violations of law, promptly to report
violations to appropriate public officials when discovered, and to take
prompt, voluntary remedial efforts.” 38 The Caremark court commented that
officers and directors could possibly face liability if the organization did not
have an effective compliance program in place.39 Caremark specifically
30. Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 962 (2009).
31. MacKessy, supra note 29.
32. Id.
33. KAPLAN, supra note 27, at 1.
34. Id.
35. Diana Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of
Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 703 (2002). See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b) (2001) (setting forth the sentencing guidelines for
organizations). The FSGO set forth the following minimum criteria for a program to be deemed
effective: 1) Compliance standards and procedures must be established to deter crime; 2) High-
level personnel must be involved in oversight; 3) Substantial discretionary authority must be
carefully delegated; 4) Compliance standards and procedures must be communicated to
employees; 5) Steps must be taken to achieve compliance in establishment of monitoring and
auditing systems and of reporting systems with protective safeguards; 6) Standards must be
consistently enforced; 7) Any violations require appropriate responses, which may include
modification of compliance standards and procedures and other preventive measures. Id.
36. U.S. SENTENCINGGUIDELINESMANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2004).
37. Murphy, supra note 35, at 710.
38. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
39. Pamela H. Bucy & Anthony A. Joseph, Conducting Business in the 21st Century: How to
Avoid Organizational Suicide (Part 1), 70 ALA. L. 185, 186–187 (2009).
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made mention of a 1963 Delaware Supreme Court case, Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers, in which the Delaware Supreme Court held that absent cause for
suspicion, the directors have no duty to install and operate a corporate
system of espionage to find wrongdoing that they have no reason to think
exists.40 However, the Caremark court emphasized the directors “ought to
have known” of the wrongdoing in Graham, as the directors are under a
duty to bring the corporation into compliance with the law.41 Therefore,
Caremark adopts a narrow interpretation of Graham and rejects the
supposition that there be a basis for suspicion to install an effective
compliance program; rather, it is the duty of the officers and directors to
proactively ensure compliance with the law.42
Due to the increasing pressure, corporate Boards of Directors (Boards)
have become burdened with ensuring an adequate compliance program that
meets, if not exceeds, the standards set by the FSGO.43 Boards were faced
with several issues when deciding how to effectively implement a
compliance program that would serve the best interests of the company.44 A
significant issue became the possibility that negative information generated
by the compliance program would ultimately be used against the
corporation, either by the government or in civil suits.45 Consequently, the
more effective a compliance program, the more harm it could possibly
inflict on the corporation when it became subject to litigation.46 Others
argued that compliance programs would only be implemented to serve as a
window-dressing function and give the illusion of market legitimacy.47
Irrespective of how the company viewed the ultimate objective of its
compliance program, it became clear that if organizations failed to
implement a compliance program that effectively allowed for adequate self-
policing, the FSGO would have failed in providing an adequate incentive
for corporations to build an effective program that encouraged compliance
with the applicable rules and regulations.48 However, given that companies
could take advantage of the sentence downgrade feature of the FSGO by
evidencing a strong and effective compliance program,49 many companies
40. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. MacKessy, supra note 29.
44. Id.
45. Philip A. Wellner, Effective Compliance Programs and Corporate Criminal Prosecutions,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 510 (2005) (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
REPORT OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
6 (2003)).
46. Id. at 511.
47. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance,
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 495 (2003).
48. Wellner, supra note 45, at 520.
49. Michael Goldblatt, Implementing Effective Compliance Programs, 38 PRAC. LAW. 75, 77
(1992).
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deemed it necessary to implement a robust compliance program that met the
standard set forth by the FSGO. Additionally, prosecutors began to adopt a
more stringent approach against corporate defendants on both a state and
federal level, thereby highlighting the need for companies to have effective
programs in place that could provide evidence of adequate self-policing.50
Subsequently, compliance programs became more integrated with general
risk management practices, specifically within large banking
organizations.51
B. A SEPARATECLASS OFRISK: COMPLIANCERISK
In 2005, compliance risk became recognized as a distinct class of risk
when the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee)
defined “compliance risk” as “the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions,
material financial loss, or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as a result of
its failure to comply with laws, regulations, rules, related self-regulatory
organization standards, and codes of conduct applicable to its banking
activities.”52 The Basel Committee went on to further outline ten principles
that compliance functions within banking organizations should follow,
covering aspects such as reporting lines to resourcing for compliance
functions.53 These ten principles became the benchmark for compliance
functions within global banking organizations until October 2008 when the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve released Supervisory Letter SR
08-8 (SR 08-8)54 that provided guidance regarding the compliance function
in banking organizations.
SR 08-8 is consistent with the Basel Committee guidance and endorses
its principles55—both agree that banking organizations have faced
continuing challenges with risk management, specifically compliance risk
50. Id.
51. MacKessy, supra note 29.
52. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, COMPLIANCE AND THE COMPLIANCE
FUNCTION IN BANKS 7 (2005). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum
for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters and its objective is to enhance
understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision
worldwide.
53. Id. at 9. The ten principles the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision outlined were: 1)
Responsibilities of the Board of Directors for Compliance: Overseeing Management of Bank’s
Compliance Risk; 2) Responsibilities of Senior Management for Compliance: Effective
Management; 3) Responsibilities of Senior Management for Compliance: Establishing and
Communicating Compliance Policy; 4) Responsibilities of Senior Management for Compliance:
Establishing a Permanent and Effective Compliance Function; 5) Compliance Function Principles:
Independence; 6) Compliance Function Principles: Resources; 7) Compliance Function
Responsibilities: Assist Senior Management in Managing Effecting the Compliance Risks faced
by the Bank; 8) Relationship with Internal Audit; 9) Cross-Border Issues; 10) Outsourcing.
54. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 08-8/CA 08-11: COMPLIANCE RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS AND OVERSIGHT AT LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS WITH
COMPLEX COMPLIANCE PROFILES 2 (2008).
55. Id.
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management.56 SR 08-8 further clarifies, that for US banking organizations,
there are certain points to focus on, including a firm-wide approach to
compliance risk, independence of compliance staff, and responsibilities of
Boards and senior management regarding compliance risk management and
oversight.57
II. THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION OF AN INDEPENDENT
COMPLIANCE FUNCTION
A. COMPENSATIONCONCERNS
As compliance has grown into an area of high demand, compensation
concerns have also accompanied this area of growth.58 SR 08-8 provides
that, “[c]ompensation and incentive programs should be carefully structured
to avoid undermining the independence of compliance staff. Compliance
staff should not be compensated on the basis of the financial performance of
the business line. Such an arrangement creates an improper conflict of
interest.”59 This very statement indicates a contradiction—how can
compliance staff be compensated if not for the performance of the business
line that contributes to the firm’s bottom line?
Compensation in the financial services industry tends to be much more
generous than other sectors of the economy60 given that incentive
compensation, in the form of annual bonuses, can often be double or triple
an individual’s base compensation.61 In a recent survey of compensation for
compliance staff conducted by the National Regulatory Services, 60% of
the respondents to the survey said they participate in some form of
incentive compensation program.62 The data analyzed by the survey
indicated incentive compensation is generally around 20% to 30% of base
compensation, with some respondents indicating that they received
incentive compensation equal to 100% of their base compensation.63 This
could come into conflict with SR 08-8; however, it would depend upon
what the incentive compensation is tied to—whether it is tied to a more
short-term indicator, such as the company’s profitability for a given year or
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Viswanatha & Wolf, supra note 2.
59. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 2.
60. Mark Kolakowski, Compensation in Financial Services, ABOUT.COM FINANCIAL
CAREERS, http://financecareers.about.com/bio/Mark-Kolakowski-33968.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2013).
61. NAT'L REGULATORY SERVS., NRS COMPLIANCE COMPENSATION STUDY 2011 4 (2011).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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whether the incentive compensation is based on a more long-term indicator,
such as shareholder value.64
Incentive compensation is usually viewed through a short-term or long-
term lens.65 If companies focus on too many short-term incentives, they run
the risk of an improper increase in short-term risk taking.66 As with prior
financial crises, short-term bonuses can encourage individuals to maximize
current profits at the expense of long-term shareholder value.67 On the other
hand, stock options provide the benefit of motivating employees to increase
the value of the company’s share price with the intent of focusing on a more
long-term approach.68
Given that financial services employees may not bear the full cost of
their failures because they are agents of the corporation, there is a
significant incentive to take more risk than they otherwise would in the
short-term approach.69 A significant conflict of interest arises when a
compliance officer approves a transaction that could well determine
profitability for the company, ultimately affecting his incentive
compensation. Therefore, issues arise when companies award compliance
officers incentive compensation based on more risky strategies that could
have an impact on the systematic risk to the company.70
Issues may also arise when compliance staff are provided with stock
options. If compliance officers are provided with long-term stock option
incentive plans, this compensation arrangement could thereby affect the
“independence” that compliance is supposed to maintain; hence, some
companies do not permit compliance staff to participate in stock option
programs in order to maintain an appearance that compliance is completely
independent.71 Stock options also increase employees’ incentive to take risk
because they are looking to further increase the stock price to make their
stock options more valuable.72
The incentives provided by compensation should not be considered
independently, but rather holistically.73 The Institute of International
64. Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation
Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 233–34 (1999).
65. Id.
66. Greta E. Coward & Bart J. Briggs, The Perfect Storm Swirling Around Executive
Compensation and the Related Corporate Governance Changes, 26 CORP. COUNS. Q., July 2010,
at 1.
67. David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51
B.C. L. REV. 435, 440 (2010).
68. Stan Mack, Why Do Companies Offer Stock Options?, ZACKS,
http://finance.zacks.com/companies-offer-stock-options-8473.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
69. Martin N. Baily et al., Regulation of Executive Compensation in Financial Services
(Council on Foreign Relations, Working Paper, 2010).
70. Id.
71. INDEP. DIRS. COUNCIL, BOARDOVERSIGHT OF FUND COMPLIANCE 21 (2009).
72. See Baily et al., supra note 69.
73. INST. OF INT'L FIN., COMPENSATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: INDUSTRY PROGRESS AND
THE AGENDA FOR CHANGE 21 (2009). Front office staff refers to specific groups of employees
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Finance (IIF) produced a paper in 2009 that discussed compensation in the
overall risk management space of financial services firms and identified two
main issues that arise—the disparity in the compensation levels between
front office producers and risk management staff, along with the need to
control risk with revenue generation when considering incentive
compensation for risk management staff.74
With regard to the disparity in compensation levels between front office
producers and risk management staff, the IIF commented that compensation
structures should incorporate a review of pay differential between oversight
functions and producers.75 The disparity of pay is important to note given
that a mid-level front office producer can take home approximately
$300,000 per year, while the average total compensation for compliance
staff (across junior and senior corporate titles) is $125,000.76 It then
becomes important to ensure that compensation for compliance staff is
adequate, but does not have so much a disparity from other front office
employees that it becomes an issue when determining total compensation.77
More importantly, the IIF recognizes the balance that needs to be struck
between controlling risk and revenue generation.78 Given that qualitative
measures play a much more important part in risk management incentive
compensation than quantitative measures, it is important to ensure that a
conflict of interest does not arise that would wrongly incentivize risk
management staff to increase risk solely for the purpose of revenue
generation.79 Given that incentive compensation is usually derived from
quantitative measures to provide a concrete benchmark, the difficulty
becomes in assessing what is the correct criteria to use in determining risk
management incentive compensation. The IIF survey of respondents
indicated that companies, in setting incentive compensation, have used a
variety of qualitative and quantitative measures, including management
discretion, qualitative assessment, firm profits, overall firm risk-adjusted
profits, and overall firm revenues.80
Another complication involved in measuring compliance staff
performance rests on which performance indicator is most effective.81 The
role of compliance, as other Risk functions in large banking organizations,
tends to be a thankless task, “because compliance is one of those things that
within financial services firms whose departments are considered “revenue generating” and are
not designated as a cost center for the company.
74. Id. Note for the purposes of this study, risk management staff was inclusive of compliance
risk staff.
75. Id.
76. NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., supra note 61, at 4.
77. See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 73, at 21.
78. Id. at 22.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 62 for list of indicators.
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no one notices when it goes right, and [everyone] notices when it goes
horribly wrong.”82 Others have indicated that companies do not take
compliance seriously until there is some form of misconduct.83 It becomes
difficult then to pinpoint a correct indicator that will effectively measure
compliance staff performance to ensure that performance is adequately
assessed and is not reactive as the above quotes indicate.
SR 08-8 places the responsibility on the Board to ensure, “that senior
management has established appropriate incentives to integrate compliance
objectives into the management goals and compensation structure across the
organization.”84 As demand for compliance professionals increases with the
ever-increasing regulatory environment, large banking organizations have
to ensure they are adequately compensating for the role while not creating
perverse incentives.85 Overall, the compensation concerns for compliance
staff become a significant challenge in ensuring an independent compliance
function within the guidelines provided by SR 08-8.
B. REPORTING LINECONCERNS
One of the most important determinants of the compliance officer’s
empowerment in the organization lies with the compliance function’s
reporting line.86 The compliance officer should be able to raise matters of
concern without fear of reprisal or a conflict of interest.87 If the compliance
officer does not have the proper reporting structure, the overall compliance
program is likely to be ineffective and could potentially fail.88
As outlined in SR 08-8, compliance independence is necessary in order
to obtain objectivity and avoid conflicts of interest.89 Likewise, it is also
important to build a compliance program that cultivates a trustful corporate
environment with appropriate incentives and rewards that are aligned with
honesty and fair dealing.90 SR 08-8 recognizes that compliance staff should
82. Darcy Jacobsen, Using Recognition to Build Compliance (And Avoid Risk), GLOBOFORCE
(Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.globoforce.com/gfblog/2013/using-recognition-to-build-compliance-
and-avoid-risk/.
83. Stuart Gittleman, Compliance Staff Can Help Their Firms by Reflecting Regulators’
Expectations, SEC Enforcer Says, REUTERS FIN. REGULATORY FORUM (Oct. 16, 2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2013/10/16/compliance-staff-can-help-their-
firms-by-reflecting-regulators-expectations-sec-enforcer-says/.
84. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 7.
85. Viswanatha & Wolf, supra note 2.
86. SCOTT A RONEY ET AL., ETHICS RESOURCE CTR., LEADING CORPORATE INTEGRITY:
DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF ETHICS AND COMPLIANCEOFFICER (CECO) 6 (2010).
87. Id.
88. DONNA BOEHME, FROM ENRON TO MADOFF: WHY MOST CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND
ETHICS PROGRAMS ARE POSITIONED FOR FAILURE 5, 1–7 (2009), available at
http://www.compliancestrategists.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/March-5-2009-Boehme-PDF-
Download.pdf.
89. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 2.
90. Johanna Pitcairn, Corporate Compliance and Executive Compensation Since the AIG
Scandal, 82-DEC N.Y. St. B.J., Nov./Dec. 2010, at 35, 36.
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work closely with business lines and emphasizes the need for strong
working relationships in order to have an effective compliance function.91
In addition to banking regulators, securities regulators, such as the SEC,
have also emphasized the need for an independent compliance program that
has an appropriate amount of standing and authority to implement programs
that objectively monitor and escalate issues.92 As Carlo di Florio, the former
Director for the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations,
highlighted, all too often the mindset amongst senior management involves
a “sweep it under the rug” mentality that begs the question as to how
independent and challenging compliance functions truly are within these
organizations.93
Maintaining an effective and independent compliance function is made
more complicated through the perception of the role within the overall
function because the role of the compliance officer was previously viewed
as someone in lower-level management with little empowerment and
mandate to fulfill his or her role.94 Some have gone so far to comment that
“compliance officers have become trendy in recent years . . . they act
mainly as window dressing.”95 Some viewed compliance as an irritating
cost center that impedes business development.96 However, as time passed
and more corporate blunders have been unveiled, companies have realized
the importance of compliance functions and believe that compliance is an
essential part of general business operations.97 Therefore, a pre-requisite to
building and developing a robust and independent compliance function is
ensuring the individuals within the department are adequately empowered
to receive the proper level of stature and respect within the organization.
Given that compliance functions have been increasing in size during the
past decade, there has been considerable debate as to what the appropriate
reporting line structure should look like.98 Certain stakeholders in the
debate—senior management, external boards, general counsel, and senior
compliance officials—often do not agree on what is the appropriate
reporting line structure.99 There are a range of possibilities for possible
compliance reporting lines, some being stand-alone (reporting directly to
91. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 2.
92. Carlo V. di Florio, Dir., SEC Off. of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, Remarks at
the Compliance Outreach Program (Jan. 31, 2012).
93. Id.
94. BOEHME, supra note 88, at 3.
95. Hannah Clark, Chief Ethics Officers: Who Needs Them?, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2006, 12:05
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2006/10/23/leadership-ethics-hp-lead-govern-
cx_hc_1023ethics.html.
96. Robertson Park & Timothy P. Peterson, Regulatory: Compliance Stakes Its Independence,
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the Board), others reporting to Risk, or to the general counsel.100 Decisions
about the reporting relationship are not taken lightly, as the reporting line
structure can be a reflection of the organization’s priorities and can also
provide protection in the event of external scrutiny.101 Of course, each
compliance program is based on the unique need of the firm, as there is no
cookie-cutter approach that companies can take to implement an effective
compliance program.
1. Compliance as a Stand-Alone Department
Compliance as a stand-alone department allows for a completely
independent function in which all compliance personnel provide support to
each of the firm’s business units, even if the firm’s business operations are
in different countries.102 Some firms find this approach impractical given
that it is undesirable to have one compliance function focus on sometimes
conflicting legal requirements or expectations of different jurisdictions.103
Having a stand-alone compliance function can also increase costs and
potentially create new silos, creating inefficient working conditions.104
However, there are certain benefits to this approach as well. The stand-
alone approach is one way to completely avoid a conflict of interest with
the business, given that there would be completely separate reporting lines
and no opportunity for the business to undermine decisions made by
compliance.105 As a stand-alone reporting area within the organization, it is
less likely that compliance input will be interfered with when difficult
decisions need to be made.106
Regulators often gain comfort when compliance is organized as a stand-
alone reporting area, such that the absence of an intermediary provides
unfettered access to the Board when escalation of issues is warranted.107
The Board also gains comfort when compliance-related issues are brought
directly to its attention in order to determine proper remedial action, given
that the Board can be held liable based on a host of regulations, including
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and the increased enforcement and
prosecution of FCPA and anti-money laundering violations.108
100. KPMG, THE FUTURE OF COMPLIANCE: COMPLIANCE FUNCTIONS AS STRATEGIC
PARTNERS IN THENEWREGULATORY WORLD 10 (2012).
101. RONEY, supra note 86, at 22.
102. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS'N, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE 18 (2013).
103. Id.
104. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, ASCENDING THE MATURITY CURVE: EFFECTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF ENTERPRISE RISK AND COMPLIANCE 13 (2011).
105. RONEY, supra note 86, at 23.
106. Id.
107. KPMG, supra note 100, at 10.
108. Park & Peterson, supra note 96.
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As SR 08-8 indicates, compliance should have an “appropriately
prominent status within the organization.”109 While SR 08-8 leaves open
exactly how to go about achieving “prominent status” to the organization to
decide based on its unique needs, the stand-alone option has become a
solution that many companies have started to adopt to demonstrate clear
mechanisms for independent and direct reporting to the Board.110
2. Compliance Reporting through Risk
Given that compliance was specifically named as a separate risk class
by the Basel Committee in 2005, some firms have considered compliance
risk as part of their general risk management practice.111 In this scenario,
compliance risk then becomes a subset of the enterprise-risk management
program, in which there are established procedures for setting risk
measurement, control mechanisms, and monitoring procedures.112 A
possible downside to the strategy of ingraining compliance within the
already established Risk function is that an institution can take too narrow
of an approach because it may not consider broader values than merely
achieving reliability and conformity with existing laws and regulations.113
An organization can be in technical compliance with the law through the
enterprise-risk management practices, but it can still have exposure to
reputational risk concerns if it does not abide by the spirit of the law
through the lens of the compliance officer.114
SR 08-8 notes two main benefits of placing compliance within the Risk
function—it benefits from an aggregate view of risk exposure and an
integrated approach to managing those risks.115 If implemented effectively,
compliance would be constructed from within the enterprise and promoted
as a core key value throughout the organization.116 However, the Risk
organization could be perceived differently if compliance was included
within its overall umbrella, as Risk staff may find it difficult to achieve,
“peer status with business line leaders and will likely not have the desired
impact at the crucial moment when a contrarian voice is needed.”117
Research recently conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit set out
to analyze how senior executives in various companies assess their risk
109. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 7.
110. KPMG, supra note 100, at 10.
111. Lee, supra note 21, at 872.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 873.
115. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 3.
116. Lee, supra note 21, at 873.
117. PROTIVITI, EFFECTIVE POSITIONING OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION:
ENABLING THE CHIEF RISKOFFICER’S SUCCESS 9 (2013).
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mitigation capabilities against how the company is performing.118 The
results showed three observations—that companies may be underestimating
the extent of risk and compliance failures in their organization, risk and
compliance management processes may appear to work well until
something goes wrong, and companies may not be learning the broader
lessons from risk failures.119 One could interpret these results to indicate the
overall Risk function within banking organizations may not be working as
well in practice as it may be in theory.
Organizations would need to consider these ideas when thinking about
integrating the compliance function into the existing Risk function, such
that the organization can best align with SR 08-8 in order to “benefit from
an aggregate view of the organization’s compliance risk exposure.”120
3. Compliance Reporting through General Counsel
While SR 08-8 does not directly address compliance reporting through
the general counsel, some firms place the compliance function within the
legal department, which has often drawn stark criticism from compliance
professionals.121 However, more recently, many have come to recognize the
distinct mandates between the general counsel and compliance, along with
the inherent conflicts that may arise.122 Most notably, the general counsel
could be put in a compromising situation if she has to fulfill the
responsibility of defending a corporate action that could appear
questionable from a compliance perspective.123
Generally, both compliance and the general counsel are tasked with
ensuring the organization complies with the relevant laws, regulations,
rules, and standards.124 Their roles diverge in how they achieve their
respective objectives and impact the organization.125 The general counsel is
usually perceived as the “legal defender” of the company tasked with
avoiding or limiting legal risks, while compliance is mandated to prevent
and detect misconduct.126 The difference has been succinctly stated as,
118. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 104. Companies that participated in this
survey included compliance risk within the overall risk management umbrella for this comparative
study.
119. Id.
120. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 3.
121. Compliance Professionals Overwhelmingly Reject General Counsel Reporting Structure,
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“lawyers (general counsel) tell you whether you can do something, and
compliance tells you whether you should.”127 While these tasks are
complementary in the sense that they are both protecting the interests of the
firm, they are substantively different duties and objectives.128
There are others who believe that there is no inherent contradiction
here—instead, these individuals argue that the role of the general counsel is
not only to address the question of “what is technically legal” but also to
raise and analyze the question of “what is right.”129 Consequently, it is
argued that the general counsel will adopt a “what-is-right” attitude given
this attitude is central to the role of the modern, broad-gauged general
counsel.130 Others point to the fact that the general counsel and compliance
each have a unique position in the company giving access to sensitive
information. The general counsel’s unique position in a corporation may
allow her to have access to privileged information that may require
uncomfortable choices as opposed to an independent third-party view that
compliance could take.131 Whether or not an organization prefers to adopt
the general counsel reporting structure for compliance, it is important to
emphasize the need for strong controls to maintain adequate checks and
balances to ensure that conflicts are being properly mitigated.132
III. CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMPLIANCE FUNCTIONS
WITHIN LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
There are certain aspects of compliance functions that can be enhanced
to ensure a more effective and robust compliance program, specifically: a)
an enhanced process for incentive-based compensation for compliance staff;
b) the optimal reporting structure for compliance; and c) compliance
representation on firm committees.
A. ENHANCED PROCESS FOR INCENTIVE-BASEDCOMPENSATION
FORCOMPLIANCE STAFF
As explored in Part II, there are various challenges that arise when
incentive compensation is factored into compliance staff pay. If compliance
staff salaries are based on the company’s performance, compliance staff—
127. Roy Snell, Who Reports to Whom?, CORP. SEC’Y (Feb. 1, 2000) (emphasis added),
http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/regulation-and-legal/11218/who-reports-whom/.
128. Tabuena, supra note 124, at 6.
129. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Don’t Divorce the GC and Compliance Officer, HARVARD L. SCH.
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8987, 8993 (Feb. 23, 1998)).
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as is true of other financial services professionals—will want to maximize
their potential paychecks,133 while the company will want to ensure that
there are adequate checks and balances on the amount of risk the firm is
being allowed to take. How can an organization ensure they are
compensating compliance staff enough, but not too much? One solution is
to completely eliminate incentive-based compensation to eradicate the
existence of a potential conflict of interest. Another less extreme idea would
be to have incentive-based compensation tied to a performance indicator
that is separate and apart from the firm’s performance.
Incentive-based compensation becomes a vicious cycle where,
“employees focus on doing what they need to do to gain rewards—and that
just feeds their self-interest even more . . . people chase the money ‘often at
the expense’ of doing other things that would help the organization.”134
Companies run the risk of employees expecting the “contingent reward,”
and eventually employees see the payment less like a bonus and more like
the status quo.135 All too often, if individuals do not feel they are being
compensated well enough, they play “musical chairs,” where some
companies lure talent away from other companies, often luring employees
away with the promise of a 20% increase in salary.136 Organizations must
align this thinking with the guidance provided in SR 08-8, which states that,
“compensation and incentive programs should be carefully structured to
avoid undermining the independence of compliance staff.”137
Regulators have commented that flawed incentive compensation
practices in the financial industry have previously rewarded employees for
increasing the organization’s revenue or short-term profit without a
sufficient recognition of the risks involved.138 Therefore, a company could
create a compensation system that relies solely on a guaranteed base salary
that does away with risky incentive-based rewards.139 However, this will
likely not work because the industry will find a way around it.
Organizations would simply take the amount of the incentive-based portion
of pay and increase the individual’s base salary to compensate for the lack
133. Viswanatha & Wolf, supra note 2.
134. Kevin Gray, How NOT to Do Incentive Pay, CBS NEWS (Sept. 21, 2009, 3:00 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505125_162-51344828/how-not-to-do-incentive-pay/.
135. Donald Delves, Is Incentive Compensation a True Motivator?, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2011,
1:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/donalddelves/2011/02/16/is-incentive-compensation-a-
true-motivator/.
136. Viswanatha & Wolf, supra note 2.
137. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 6.
138. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36396 (June 25, 2010).
139. Craig D. Miller & John J. Heber, Eliminate All Incentive Compensation, AM. BANKER
(Apr. 26, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/eliminate-all-incentive-
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of incentive-based compensation.140 This could cause a host of issues,
including a lack of motivation for the employee, inflated pay, and
continuous turnover by employees looking to increase their salaries by
constantly switching firms.141 Overall, the idea of eliminating incentive-
based compensation would seem to be the simplest and easiest mechanism
to comply with SR 08-8 and ensure a completely independent compliance
function; but, the approach would not work in a practical setting where
many of the individuals in the financial services industry are by their very
nature motivated by incentive-based compensation.
Another option, in the spirit of SR 08-8, is to align a form of incentive-
based compensation with a qualitative performance indicator that parallels
SR 08-8’s view of how compliance should operate. SR 08-8 provides that
“quantitative limits reflecting the Board’s risk appetite can be established
for market and credit risk [and] compliance risk does not lend itself to
similar processes.”142 Given that SR 08-8 acknowledges that quantitative
limits do not exist to determine risk appetite or other indicators for
compliance risk, the qualitative indicators referenced by the IIF can provide
guidance to determine risk management incentive-based compensation.143
The IIF included five indicators in its 2009 risk-management
compensation survey, including management discretion, qualitative
assessment, firm profits, overall firm risk-adjusted profits, and overall firm
revenues.144 In order to ensure that compliance stays within the boundaries
set by the guidance of SR 08-8, the IIF factors that could possibly create an
improper conflict of interest or undermine the independence of compliance
staff should be rejected. The criteria pertaining to firm revenues or profits
should be rejected given that, according to SR 08-8, “[c]ompliance staff
should not be tied to the financial performance of the business line.”145
Therefore, these three IIF criteria—firm profits, overall firm risk-adjusted
profits, and overall firm revenues—can be rejected as a viable option for
how to determine compliance incentive-based compensation.
The remaining two factors provided by the IIF are management
discretion and qualitative assessment. Management discretion, in which the
entire decision-making process is left to the employee’s manager, could
indicate charges of bias or favoritism and could possibly leave employees
140. Viswanatha & Wolf, supra note 2. Competing institutions lure talent away from other
companies with the promise of higher salaries, sometimes 20% larger than what the candidate is
currently making. The 20% increase is often in the form of a base salary increase.
141. Id.
142. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 1.
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144. Id. at 22.
145. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 6.
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feeling undervalued.146 However, others argue that management discretion
allows managers to properly groom their best performers.147
After conducting a horizontal review across the banking industry, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve released its own report on
incentive compensation practices in 2011.148 There were two challenges
noted when considering judgment and discretion in the context of incentive
compensation arrangements: “1) ensuring that decisions based on judgment
are made consistently…and 2) risk adjustments may only be one of many
inputs into decision-making about incentive compensation awards.”149
Therefore, management discretion would be a poor performance indicator
to determine incentive-based compensation because it could undermine
consistency and effectiveness across the organization.
The final factor provided by the IIF is qualitative assessment.
Qualitative assessment could possibly be seen as similar to management
discretion given the potential for lack of consistency in the judgment-
making process. However, “to promote consistency and effectiveness of the
impact of judgment on balanced risk-taking incentives…firms are expected
to have robust policies and procedures to guide the consistent use of
judgment.”150 If organizations could evidence the consistency of qualitative
assessment being used across compliance groups, they would be following
the guidance set forth in SR 08-8 by carefully structuring incentive
programs to avoid undermining the independence of compliance staff.151
Qualitative assessment allows for a combination of the advantages of
management discretion, coupled with the benefits of taking firm
performance into consideration. As SR 08-8 notes, the financial
performance of the business line should not factor into compliance
incentive-based compensation; therefore, the qualitative assessment
performance indicator can allow for a more holistic approach.
Qualitative assessment indicators could include a variety of
performance driven-metrics along with measures to determine whether an
employee would be eligible for certain incentive-based payouts.152 A
performance indicator that creates targets and constructive assessments for
the employee will be beneficial because an employee who is not satisfied
146. Mark A. Newman, Positive Reinforcement Through Incentives, REMODELING MAGAZINE
(May 22, 2012), http://www.remodeling.hw.net/bonus-systems-and-incentives/positive-
reinforcement-through-incentives.aspx.
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with his pay will be incentivized to do better work in the year ahead to
boost his performance.153
Qualitative assessment can take different forms through the
performance review process. The overall qualitative assessment can
include various factors of the employee’s performance, including
accomplishments, strengths, opportunities for improvement, and how well
the employee exhibits the company’s values.154 However, considerations
also need to be made for certain situations involving staff shortages or other
situations that lead to a reduction in employees’ productivity.155 A
qualitative assessment will need to consider both the employee-specific
review in tandem with any special circumstances for the corporation.
Performance can have different definitions for different groups within
the organization.156 For the compliance department, performance should be
measured by its independence and ultimate risk control for the firm.157
Therefore, it is important to ensure the incentive-based compensation is
adopted successfully to reward behavior that is positive for the company.158
As presented, incentive-based compensation would be appropriate if
adequately measured using a qualitative assessment approach.
B. OPTIMALREPORTING STRUCTURE FORCOMPLIANCE
SR 08-8 does not prescribe a particular organizational structure for
compliance; however, SR 08-8 provides guidance to indicate that conflicts
of interest should be minimized when organizations decide to have
compliance report through the business line in some capacity.159
Considering the three options for reporting line structures presented in
Part II, the optimal structure would be one that takes ideas from each of the
three options to maximize independence while minimizing conflict of
interest. It is vital to view any approach from both a theoretical and
practical perspective to ensure that the approach meets the criteria of both
the regulatory guidance provided and the actual market environment.
Given that SR 08-8 and regulators have put their trust in compliance as
a control function, it is important to underscore the independence aspect of
compliance.160 SR 08-8 expressly states, “a particular challenge for many
153. Id.
154. Performance: Appraisal: Qualitative Evaluation Form, SOC'Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT. (Aug. 21, 2014),
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organizations is attaining an appropriate level of independence with respect
to compliance staff.”161 Therefore, the optimal structure to address this issue
is the stand-alone reporting line structure, which provides the highest level
of independence of the three reporting line structures examined.162
Even though the stand-alone reporting line has the primary advantage
of independence, it does have the potential to create silos and become
impractical for conflicting regulatory requirements across jurisdictions that
could add inefficiency and increased costs.163 However, rather than viewing
these two ideas as roadblocks to an effective and independent compliance
function, this approach can be lauded for its potential safeguards.
Dr. John Kotter, a well-known speaker on the topics of leadership and
change, describes an innovative idea to address inefficiency amid constant
turbulence and disruption in the modern corporation.164 Dr. Kotter describes
developing a “second operating system . . . that uses an agile, network-like
structure and a very different set of processes [to] complement rather than
overburden the traditional hierarchy.”165 Dr. Kotter goes on to describe this
solution as having roots in familiar structures to ensure that organizations
pay attention to strategy and create opportunities while ensuring an
effective, yet nimble organization.166
Dr. Kotter’s idea of a “second operating system” is how compliance
can, and should, operate in large banking organizations—compliance needs
to use a different set of processes to be independent enough, while also
using a network structure that does not slow the organization down.
Compliance can then assess the business and react with agility while
working in tandem with the business lines. The “second operating system”
thinking also complies with SR 08-8’s guidance for compliance monitoring
and testing, in which “robust compliance monitoring and testing play a key
role in identifying weaknesses.”167 Most importantly, this approach
primarily retains the independence of compliance as an advisory function to
abide by the statement, “compliance tells you whether you should [do
something].”168
Dr. Kotter uses the idea of the “second operating system” mainly to
present a way to effect change in organizations that feel threatened by
competitors.169 Dr. Kotter argues that by adopting a second system that
keeps the original system in check, it brings about innovation and speed that
161. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 5.
162. See supra Part II.
163. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCEUNIT, supra note 104.
164. John P. Kotter, Accelerate!, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2012, at 45.
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allow the organization to adapt.170 If compliance were to operate as an
effective “second operating system,” there would be potential for
compliance to not only become the safeguard function of the company, but
also to push the company forward to develop strategies and solutions that it
may not have previously explored.
It is important then to understand the proposed challenges posed by the
other reporting line structures. SR 08-8 suggests there are a different set of
risks presented by compliance risk compared to general risk management
practices, as it provides that, “the management and oversight of compliance
risk presents certain challenges . . . [C]ompliance risk does not lend itself to
similar processes for establishing and allocating overall risk tolerance.”171 If
compliance risk does not lend itself to the similar processes that have been
established within the enterprise-risk management framework, it could be a
challenge to provide adequate oversight of nonconforming standards.
Additionally, many of the benefits that have been put forth for the Risk
reporting line structure would be diminished by the fact that compliance
would require a separate set of standards to effectively monitor compliance
risk because compliance risk involves a different set of monitoring than
established risk management practices.172 Therefore, compliance would not
be an effective function for the company if it would have to operate within
the Risk reporting line structure.
The inherent conflict of interest presented in the general counsel
reporting line structure is fraught with potential issues that conflict with SR
08-8 guidance as well. SR 08-8 explicitly provides that compliance
independence is meant to “avoid conflicts of interest.”173 As many have
noted, the compliance function is at odds with the function of being a legal
advisor or advocate for the company.174 Compliance is intended to make a
company more accountable to its constituents and the outside world.175 How
can compliance achieve this objective if there is the possibility that the
general counsel may quash a compliance issue because general counsel
does not perceive of it as an adequate “legal” risk? There needs to be
delineation between the two roles to ensure an adequate level of
independence and stature for compliance.176
Therefore, the stand-alone reporting structure would ensure the optimal
level of independence to allow compliance to function as an effective
function and within the guidelines provided by SR 08-8.
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C. COMPLIANCEREPRESENTATION ON FIRMCOMMITTEES
If organizations adopt the stand-alone reporting line structure, one way
to ensure the compliance function does not operate in a silo is to mandate
its active participation and representation on various firm governance
committees.177 If an organization can clearly evidence that compliance
remains an active independent stakeholder across various risk committees,
there is a higher likelihood that a culture of compliance will pervade
throughout the organization.178 SR 08-8 addresses compliance participation
in firm committees but does not precisely suggest how an organization
should ensure a reliable governance structure that will empower and ensure
an independent compliance function.179 Therefore, compliance needs to
have its own standing committee reporting to the Board and be an active
participant on various business-line committees across the organization.
A compliance committee should operate to amalgamate information
seen across the organization, with powers to inform, advise, and propose
ideas to the Board.180 The charter of the committee should take into
consideration factors such as how the company should address overall risk
management, how the compliance program should be designed and operate,
and what steps the Board and the company should take to communicate and
build a corporate culture of ethics.181 Operating in such a fashion will not
only reinforce the independent, third-party perspective that compliance
should foster, but will also meet the needs of SR 08-8 as “compliance risk
underscore[s] the need for a firm-wide approach to compliance risk
management and oversight.”182
The role of compliance has been described as taking the lead in
“identifying and managing the significant regulatory compliance risks to
which the business is exposed.”183 In order to achieve this objective,
compliance stakeholders must be involved with the various firm committees
in order to provide them with the appropriate business updates and
strategies to assess the potential compliance risks.184 Compliance
involvement in firm committees is beneficial because it encourages
management to seek compliance’s input on business decisions, while
177. KPMG, supra note 100, at 10.
178. Id. at 11.
179. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 5.
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allowing compliance to have direct access to real-time information.185
Furthermore, this approach will emphasize the firm’s culture of compliance
such that it can partner with the business as a trusted advisor,186 and thus it
ties back to SR 08-8’s comment that “compliance functions are generally
more effective when strong working relationships between compliance and
business line staff exist.”187
Mandating compliance participation on firm committees and the
creation of a compliance committee will address the potential challenges
that are raised with the stand-alone reporting structure. Compliance will
operate in less of a silo because compliance staff will have access to
information that is current and direct from the business. There will be
stronger working relationships forged with the business lines because
compliance will play a more active and constructive role in its decision-
making process. More importantly, compliance will still maintain its
complete independence given that it would not fall into the same reporting
structure of the business or any other firm function. By having a direct
reporting line to the Board, compliance will be able to make decisions
through an independent, third-party lens, thereby satisfying the SR 08-8
requirement for independence.188 Compliance risks across the organization
can be synthesized through the compliance committee, thereby satisfying
the SR 08-8 requirement to ensure a firm-wide approach to risk
monitoring.189
CONCLUSION
Given the recent burgeoning of the compliance industry and the ever-
changing regulatory environment, regulators, companies, and individuals
need to constantly react to the ongoing change. What will remain constant
is the need for compliance to remain an effective and independent function
within organizations.
The regulatory guidance provided by SR 08-8 provides organizations
with a blueprint to create a best-in-class compliance program; however,
because there is no “one-size-fits-all”190 approach to compliance,
organizations should adopt the best practices that will enable their
compliance program to function as an independent and effective area of the
organization in today’s ever-changing regulatory world. It is vital for
organizations not only to obtain the best resources to fit into the compliance
department, but also to shape the compliance function as effectively as
possible to stay ahead of regulatory issues that may arise. As explored
185. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS'N, supra note 102, at 7.
186. Id.
187. BD. OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 54, at 5.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1.
190. Olaoye, supra note 11.
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through this Note, organizations should implement an effective qualitative
assessment performance indicator in order to consistently and effectively
structure incentive-based compensation in alignment with SR 08-8.
Additionally, organizations should adopt a stand-alone reporting line
structure for compliance that reports directly to the Board. Finally,
compliance should be involved as an active member on various senior-level
firm committees, along with establishing an independent compliance
committee dedicated to discussing compliance risks within the organization.
Implementing these recommendations should enable the organization to
develop a best-in-class compliance program to not only manage through the
current regulatory environment but also to navigate through future
regulatory changes.
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